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Note
Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity
Rights in State and Federal Courts
Steven C. Clay
0 body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?
-William Butler Yeats1
As part of a print advertising campaign for Samsung Elec-
tronics America, Inc., David Deutsch Associates, Inc. created an
advertisement parodying the popular game show "Wheel of For-
tune."2 The advertisement featured a mechanical robot on a
mock "Wheel of Fortune" set, clearly imitating Vanna White, the
game show's hostess and famed letter-turner.3 White, who did
not consent to the ad,' sued Samsung and Deutsch 5 in federal
district court for the Central District of California, 6 alleging
they had unlawfully appropriated her identity for commercial
gain, thus violating her right of publicity. 7 The district court
1. Wnru. BUTER YEATs, Among School Children, in THE COLLECTED
POEMS OF W.B. YEATs 215-17 (Richard J. Finneran ed., 1989).
2. "Wheel of Fortune" is one of the most popular game shows in television
history. An estimated forty million people watch it daily. White v. Samsung
Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443
(1993).
3. Vanna White serves as the program's hostess and turns letters on a
large illuminated board as they are called out by three contestants attempting
to guess a hidden phrase. White also claps and cheers as the contestants spin
the "Wheel of Fortune," a large wheel with different cash amounts and prizes
for the contestant guessing the correct phrase.
4. Defendants did not ask for White's consent before running the ad. Ap-
pellant's Brief at 25, White (No. 90-55840).
5. For the remainder of this Note, the two defendants will be referred to
as "Samsung."
6. 971 F.2d at 1396.
7. White sued under California Civil Code § 3344 (West 1994) (providing
a codification of the right of publicity), the California common law right of pub-
licity, and § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
White, 971 F.2d at 1396. The "right of publicity" has been defined as "the inher-
ent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her iden-
tity." J. THOMAS McCARHY, THE RIGHTS OF PuBLIcrY AND PRvAcY § 1.1[A][1]
(1994).
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granted Samsung's motion for summary judgment,8 but the
Ninth Circuit reversed in part and remanded,9 stating that
White had established a cause of action under the California
common law right of publicity.' 0
The Ninth Circuit thus found that Samsung's use of an obvi-
ously fabricated depiction of White, posed on a television setting
protected by a copyright not even her own, may have violated
White's right of publicity. In doing so, the White court has "prob-
ably gone the farthest of any case in any court in the United
States of America"" in protecting celebrity publicity rights.' 2
Yet, this rush to protect all aspects of celebrity identity has
proceeded with little or no critical judicial analysis. The ex-
treme result in White, in particular, impels an inquiry into the
continued justification for the right of publicity, as well as that
right's effect on popular culture.' 3
8. White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1396-97. On remand, the jury awarded White $403,000, split
approximately two-thirds between her right of publicity and Lanham Act
claims, respectively. Telephone Interview with John Genga, Vanna White's At-
torney (Feb. 2, 1994). An action for punitive damages under the Lanham Act is
pending. White, 971 F.2d at 1397.
11. Felix H. Kent, California Court Expands Celebrities'Rights, N.Y. L.J.,
Oct. 30, 1992, at 3.
12. Because of the enormous number of celebrities living and working in
California, as well as the sheer volume of entertainment produced within Cali-
fornia, California publicity law will have a great impact on the rights of artists,
entertainers, and advertisers everywhere. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am.,
Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the order
rejecting rehearing en banc) ("If a Wyoming resident creates an ad that features
a California domiciliary's name or likeness, he'll be subject to California right of
publicity law even if he's careful to keep the ad from being shown in Califor-
nia."). This Note will focus primarily on California right of publicity law, be-
cause it is the most developed and influential right of publicity law in the
United States, but will deal with other jurisdictions where relevant.
13. The right of publicity question has been recently examined in H. Lee
Heatherington, Direct Commercial Exploitation of Identity: A New Age for the
Right of Publicity, 17 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 1 (1993); Michael Madow, Pri-
vate Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL.
L. REv. 125 (1993); Gretchen A. Pemberton, The Parodist's Claim to Fame: A
Parody to the Right of Publicity, 27 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 97 (1993); Steven T.
Margolin, Comment, From Imitation to Litigation: Expanded Protection for
Commercial Property Rights in Identity, 96 Dict. L. REv. 491 (1992); Christo-
pher Pesce, Note, The Likeness Monster: Should the Right of Publicity Protect
Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 782 (1990). Heatherington, Madow, Mar-
golin, and Pesce, however, predate or do not take proper account of White, a
radical extension of right of publicity law. Pemberton, although building her
analysis on White, advocates only a parody exception to the right of publicity.
Pemberton, supra, at 100.
486
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
This Note argues that the right of publicity as applied in
White and other cases has far outgrown the limited rationales
that support it and other intellectual property protections. Part
I explores the right of publicity's development from the right of
privacy, and how courts currently apply it. Part I also presents
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning for extending publicity rights in
White as an in-depth example of the right of publicity's expan-
sion. Part II demonstrates that traditional justifications for the
right of publicity are unpersuasive, and shows how the right of
publicity strikes an unrealistic balance between celebrity rights
and popular culture. Part II proposes a less expansive right of
publicity that requires direct competition with a celebrity's pri-
mary income-earning potential. 14 This new right may be called
the "right of performance." 15 This Note concludes that the ex-
pansive publicity rights exemplified by White threaten free ex-
pression and artistic development and unduly intrude upon the
public domain of popular culture.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. THE RIGHT OF PRiVACY
The right of publicity is rooted in privacy doctrine that be-
gan to develop towards the end of the nineteenth century.' 6
This right of privacy can be succinctly stated as the right "to be
let alone."' 7 Courts soon extended this right to protect private
persons from unwanted publicity.' 8
14. Direct competition with a celebrity's primary income-earning potential
refers to situations such as a celebrity imitator passing himself off as a particu-
lar celebrity for commercial gain.
15. This "right of performance" has been differentiated from the right of
publicity by Madow, supra note 13, at 209 n.395. Madow, however, did not pro-
pose the right of performance as a complete replacement for the right of public-
ity. This Note attempts to flesh out this doctrine, demonstrating how it differs
from the right of publicity and how courts might apply it.
16. A legal right to privacy was first proposed by Samuel D. Warren and
Louise D. Brandeis in an article that is widely recognized as one of the most
influential ever written. Samuel D. Warren & Louise D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890); see also McCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 1.2-
1.8, at 1-7 to 1-36 (tracing the right of privacy from Roman law onward);
Madow, supra note 13, at 167-72 (discussing early privacy cases).
17. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 193.
18. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga.
1905) (allowing recovery by non-celebrity plaintiff for defendant's use of plain-
tiff's picture in advertisement without permission). Contra Roberson v. Roch-
ester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 444 (N.Y. 1902) (finding no cause of action
under New York common law for non-celebrity minor whose picture was used
on a widely-circulated flour advertisement).
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An inchoate right of publicity is apparent in early courts'
attempts to apply the right of privacy to celebrities.1 9 Some
courts were reluctant to apply privacy rights to celebrities, stat-
ing that celebrities waived any right "to be let alone" through
their active pursuit of and profit from fame.20 Under this view,
commerce in celebrities' identities was limited to payment to the
celebrity for a waiver by the celebrity of the right to sue any
licensee of the celebrity's identity for violation of privacy
rights.21 If celebrities possessed no privacy rights, waiver
19. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 1941)
(finding the publication of a football player's photograph was authorized by his
college's publicity department), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942); Paramount
Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (W.D. Okla. 1938)
(holding that although Ohio law may recognize a right of privacy, it does not
extend to prominent, notorious, or well known persons), rev'd on other grounds,
106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939); Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 26 Ohio Law Abs.
67, 69 (C.P. 1938); cf. Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 360 (1928) (holding
Charlie Chaplin allowed to enjoin look-alike actor from performing under the
name "Charlie Aplin" on unfair competition grounds); Edison v. Edison
Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 137 (1907) (holding famous inventor al-
lowed to enjoin use of phrase "I certify that this preparation is compounded
according to the formula devised and used by myself. Thos. A. Edison" on
medicine bottle on false endorsement grounds).
20. In O'Brien, 124 F.2d at 170, a college football player was denied recov-
ery under the right of privacy for a beer company's unauthorized inclusion of
his picture on a promotional calendar, due to his active pursuit of fame. Dictum
from this case, however, illustrates the nascent right of publicity:
The right of a person to recover on quantum meruit, for the use of his
name in advertising [is not affected by this decision]. That was not the
case pleaded and attempted to be brought. The case was not for the
value of plaintiff's name in advertising a product but for damages by
way of injury to him in using his name in advertising beer.
Id. It is unclear from which source the court derived this new right.
The right of publicity's commercial possibilities can be traced as far back as
Edison, also in dictum:
If a man's name be his own property, as no less an authority than the
United States Supreme Court says it is, it is difficult to understand
why the peculiar cast of one's features is not also one's property, and
why its pecuniary value, if it has one, does not belong to its owner,
rather than the person seeking to make an unauthorized use of it.
73 N.J. Eq. at 137. Query that, if one is not entirely responsible for the pecuni-
ary value of one's features, this value should be wholly vested in the owner. See
infra part II (questioning traditional right of publicity rationales).
21. This doctrine was applied in Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby
Co., 78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1935). The plaintiff contracted with various profes-
sional baseball players for the exclusive use of their signatures on its baseball
bats. Id. at 764. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant used the players'
names on its own bats. Id. Although expressing some doubt as to whether
baseball players in the public eye had any right to privacy at all, see O'Brien,
124 F.2d at 167-70, the court held that all the plaintiff gained from the agree-
ment was a waiver preventing the players from objecting to the plaintiff's use of
the signatures. Id. at 766. Thus, plaintiff could not enforce the players' rights
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of any privacy-based cause of action possessed dubious value at
best.22
The first case to explicitly recognize that a celebrity's name
or likeness has value beyond a right of privacy was Haelan Lab-
oratories Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,23 a case involving
baseball players who licensed their statistics and images for use
on baseball cards.24 In coining the term "right of publicity," the
court stated:
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy
(which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive
privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly
be made "in gross," i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a busi-
ness or of anything else.2
5
Although the court cited little authority or policy for its decision,
Haelan Laboratories stands as the underpinning of the right of
publicity.26
against third parties. Id. at 766-67. The court further stated, "Fame is not
merchandise. It would help neither sportsmanship nor business to uphold the
sale of a famous name to the highest bidder." Id. at 766. This statement's irony
is immediately apparent in today's world of multi-million dollar endorsement
deals.
22. Even where celebrities were allowed to sue under a privacy cause of
action, damage awards were often minimal. E.g., Miller v. Madison Square
Garden Corp., 28 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (1941) (allowing the plaintiff to recover six
cents for unauthorized use of picture on bicycle race program).
23. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
24. Id. at 867.
25. Id. at 868 (applying New York common law). The court further stated,
"Whether it be labeled a 'property' right is immaterial; for here, as often else-
where, the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim
which has pecuniary worth." Id. This right raises issues including whether it
is descendible, possible tax issues, marital property issues, and so on. See
Madow, supra note 13, at 172 n.229.
26. The court stated:
[Mt is common knowledge that many prominent persons... would feel
sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing adver-
tisements .... This right of publicity would usually yield them no
money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.
Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited,
without discussion, Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. v. Liebig Extract Co., 180 F.
688 (2d Cir. 1910); Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 7
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1938); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88 (1917). The
conclusory nature of this kind of reasoning has unfortunately been repeated
throughout the case law and commentary on the right of publicity, with little
critical study. See, e.g., Heatherington, supra note 13, at 7 ("Thirty-plus years
worth of cases citing Haelan as the father of the right of publicity has removed
most doubt.").
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Two influential commentaries further developed the right of
publicity. One commentator picked up the phrase "right of pub-
licity" shortly after Haelan in a seminal article that solidified
the right of publicity's existence as separate from the right of
privacy.27 The late Professor Prosser, in a commentary univer-
sally cited in publicity cases, further delineated the difference
between privacy and publicity rights.28 In so doing, Prosser cat-
egorized violation of publicity rights as one of four different torts
constituting the invasion of privacy:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude or into his pri-
vate affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness.
29
It is the fourth of Prosser's torts, the appropriation of the plain-
tiff's name or likeness, that courts cite as the right of publicity.30
This right in one's name or likeness is assignable, 31 bestow-
ing upon it substantial commercial value and rendering it en-
forceable by third parties.32 Many courts, however, have ruled
that this right is not inheritable, 33 making it an amalgam of
New York courts, as opposed to federal courts applying New York law, have
consistently rejected a common law right of privacy or publicity. In 1984, the
New York Court of Appeals unequivocally held that the decision in Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902), was still valid in Stephano
v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 182 (1984), thus relegating
any potential publicity or privacy plaintiffs to the statutory remedies offered by
§§ 50-51 of the New York Civil Rights law, enacted as a response to Roberson in
1903. See McCARTY, supra note 7, §§ 6.9[A]-[C].
27. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
203 (1954) (arguing that, although publicity and privacy claims sometimes
overlapped, privacy plaintiffs were concerned with unwanted intrusions into
their personal lives, while publicity plaintiffs complained of uncompensated ex-
ploitation of their identities, making privacy remedies inadequate).
28. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 398-407 (1960).
29. Id. at 389. Prosser also avoided the debate over whether the right of
publicity is "property," arguing it was "pointless." Id. at 406.
30. See, e.g. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198
Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280
N.W.2d 129, 133 (Wis. 1979).
31. "Once protected by the law, [the right of publicity] is a right of value
upon which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling licenses." W. PAGE KEATON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON =H LAw OF TORTS § 117, at 854 (5th ed. 1984).
32. See, e.g., Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866,
868-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
33. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958
(6th Cir.) ("[Tihe common law has not heretofore widely recognized this right to
control commercial publicity as a property right which may be inherited.") (cita-
490
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property and privacy rights.8 4 The exact property characteris-
tics of the right of publicity remain unsettled in many jurisdic-
tions today.3 5
B. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Following the first decisions recognizing the right of public-
ity,3 6 courts articulated a variety of reasons supporting this doc-
trine.3 7 Under what may be termed the "property rationale,"
courts frequently refer to the expenditure of time, effort, talent,
and finances necessary to "become" famous.38 Celebrities have a
moral claim under this justification to any money flowing from
their fame, and those evoking this identity are free riders on the
celebrity's gravy train. This moral claim derives from basic
property theory: by exerting effort and creating something of
value, the celebrity is entitled to its exclusive possession, just as
a farmer is morally entitled to the produce of his or her field.3 9
tion omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,
603 P.2d 425, 430 (Cal. 1979) ("May the remote descendants of historic public
figures obtain damages for the unauthorized commercial use of the names and
likenesses of their distinguished ancestors? If not, where is the line to be
drawn, and who should draw it?"). But see Martin Luther King Jr., Ctr. for
Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (Ga.
1982) ("If the right of publicity dies with the celebrity, the economic value of the
right of publicity during life would be diminished because the celebrity's un-
timely death would seriously impair, if not destroy, the value of the right of
continued commercial use.").
34. E.g., Madow, supra note 13, at 172 n.229 ("[An assignable interest that
dies with its assignor is a very queer kind of property.").
35. This Note will not focus on the inheritability or other property features
of the right of publicity, concentrating instead on the scope of protection the
right offers to celebrities and the ideological underpinnings for such a right.
36. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (citing and explaining
cases).
37. These justifications for the right of publicity will be evaluated in part
II, infra.
38. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) ("Often considerable money, time and energy are needed to develop
the ability in a person's name or likeness to attract attention and evoke a de-
sired response in a particular consumer market.").
39. See Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970)
("A celebrity must be considered to have invested his years of practice and com-
petition in a public personality which eventually may reach marketable status.
That identity, embodied in his name, likeness, statistics and other personal
characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and is a type of property."). This
"moral" argument derives from Lockean property theory and natural rights,
and holds that all people have a claim to the fruits of their own labor, and that
unowned property can be controlled by mixing one's labor with the unowned
item. See Madow, supra note 13, at 175 n.239. In an excellent criticism of this
theory cited by Madow, Robert Nozick states, "If I own a can of tomato juice and
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Anyone intruding upon this right is "reaping where [they] have
not sown."40
This justification is closely related to the economic incentive
argument: the right of publicity provides an incentive to the
population to undertake socially enriching activities.41 The eco-
nomic incentive argument is the ratio decidendi of the Supreme
Court's only right of publicity case, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.4 2 This argument is the same as that underly-
ing copyright and patent law.4 3
Another argument holds that unauthorized use of a celeb-
rity's identity saturates the market, thus injuring the celebrity
by reducing demand for his or her image.4 This reasoning
deems celebrities as commodities whose value will wither from
overexposure. If celebrities lose control of their identity, a bar-
spill it in the sea ... do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly
dissipated my tomato juice?" Id. This argument seems especially cogent in the
right of publicity context, where a celebrity is in effect claiming to have spilled
his or her can of tomato juice into the "sea" of popular culture.
40. McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2.1[A], at 2-3. For another version of this
phrase, see infra note 47.
41. See McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2.2, at 2-9.
42. 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1976) ("Ohio's decision to protect petitioner's right of
publicity here rests on more than a desire to compensate the performer for the
time and effort invested in his act; the protection provides an economic incen-
tive for him to make the investment required to produce a performance of inter-
est to the public."). But see Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d
956, 959 (6th Cir.) ("Fame often is fortuitous and fleeting. It always depends on
the participation of the public in the creation of an image. It usually depends
on the communication of information about the famous person by the media."),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Madow, supra note 13, at 185-91 (describing
the outside factors that allowed Einstein, rather than any other similarly bril-
liant physicist, to become this century's personification of genius).
43. In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1983), the
Court explained the rationale underlying intellectual property law as follows:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither un-
limited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.
Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public pur-
pose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity
of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to
allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired.
Id. at 429; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964)
("Patents are not given as favors... but are meant to encourage invention by
rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by the
patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention.").
44. See, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962) ("It
could well be found that defendant's conduct saturated plaintiff's audience to
the point of curtailing his market. No performer has an unlimited demand.").
492
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rage of commercials and other media exposure would quickly
render that identity valueless.45
C. THE APPROPRIATION OF "IDENTITY" FOR COMMERCIAL USE:
APPLYING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY TODAY
Currently, twenty-four states recognize the right of public-
ity as common law or by statute.46 Courts applying the right of
publicity to unauthorized uses of a celebrity's identity distin-
guish between commercial and non-commercial use, and heavily
disfavor commercial use.47 The appropriation of identity for
45. A corollary of this argument is that, without the right of publicity, ce-
lebrities would lose a substantial portion of their incomes. See Haelan Labs.,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 816 (1953); supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (finding an exclusive
right of publicity to protect, among other things, a celebrity's pecuniary interest
in his or her prominence). Without the right of publicity, advertisers and other
commercial users would enjoy free access to a celebrity's identity, and there
would be no reason to compensate the celebrities for its use.
46. McCArw, supra note 7, § 6.2, at 6-6. The following states recognize
the right of publicity as common law: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. Id. § 6.2, at 6-6 to 6-7. Four of these
states also have statutes concurrently recognizing the right of publicity: Cali-
fornia, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1994); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08
(West 1988); Texas, TFx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (West 1994); and Wiscon-
sin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1983). Nine states, although not explicitly
recognizing the right of publicity as such, have privacy provisions sufficiently
broad to encompass this right: Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214,
§ 3A (West 1986); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-201 to 20-211, 25-840.01
(1991); Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 597-790 (Michie 1993); New York,
N.Y. Civ. RlGHTs LAw. §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992); Oklahoma, OKIA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, §§ 839.1-839.3 (West 1983); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-28
(1985); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to 47-25-1108 (1988); and
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-40 (Michie 1992).
47. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 835
(6th Cir. 1983) ("The right of publicity, as we have stated, is that a celebrity has
a protected pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of his identity.");
McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 7.2[A], at 7-2; cf. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1983) (finding that under fair use copyright in-
fringement test, commercial or profit-making uses are presumptively unfair).
But see Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 446-47
(N.D. IMI. 1991) ("Although the primary purpose of most television commercials
(like other works of a 'commercial nature') may be to increase product sales and
thereby increase income, it is not readily apparent that they are therefore de-
void of any artistic merit or entertainment value."). The Supreme Court's rea-
soning in the "Gay Olympics" case, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 541 (1987), suggests that even
commercial speech with expressive aspects is disfavored: 'he mere fact that
the SFAA claims an expressive, as opposed to a purely commercial, purpose
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commercial use constitutes the right of publicity's heart,48 and
has been phrased as receiving something "for which [the user]
should normally pay."49
A developing aspect of the right of publicity is how to deter-
mine the extent to which a use must evoke or appropriate a ce-
lebrity's identity before violating his or her right of publicity.50
The Prosser commentary originally proposed the tort as the ap-
propriation of the celebrity's "name or likeness,"51 and earlier
courts held to this phrasing.5 2 Recent case law reflects an ex-
does not give it a First Amendment right to 'appropriat[e] to itself the harvest of
those who have sown.'" Id. at 541 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court's most recent fair use case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Mu-
sic, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994), seems to adopt the holding offered in
Eveready regarding the commercial vs. non-commercial factor. The Court
states, in determining how a parody's commercial nature may impact its appli-
cation of the fair use defense to copyright infringement, that
[i]f, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding
of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustra-
tive uses listed in the preamble paragraph of [17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988)]
.... Congress could not have intended such a rule, which certainly is
not inferable from the common-law cases, arising as they did from the
world of letters in which Samuel Johnson could pronounce that "[nlo
man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money."
Id. at 1174. This holding seriously undercuts arguments based upon federal
copyright and commercial speech doctrine that commercial nature is a factor
weighing substantially, if not presumptively, against any identity use. See in-
fra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing "fair use"). The applicability of
terms such as "purely commercial" and "expressive" to art and expression of any
kind will be discussed in part II, infra.
48. See, e.g., McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 7.2, at 7-6 ("The clearest case... of
infringement of the Right of Publicity is the unpermitted use of personal iden-
tity in the advertising of goods or services.").
49. Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONMMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966). Some circularity is imme-
diately apparent in making the law dependent on what usually requires pay-
ment in this field, because what usually requires payment is, of course,
dependent upon the law.
50. One commentator has identified a trend towards protecting "all inci-
dents of a person's identity against wrongful commercial appropriation."
Heatherington, supra note 13, at 12.
51. Prosser, supra note 28, at 390; see also supra notes 28-29 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Prosser's seminal commentary on privacy and publicity
rights).
52. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 717 (9th
Cir. 1970) (noting the strong federal policy of free competition in ideas not mer-
iting or qualifying for patent protection); Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F.
Supp. 1145, 1145-47 (C.D. Cal. 1969) ("[Ilmitation alone does not give rise to a
cause of action."). But see Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir.
1962) (upholding action for voice imitation, but under the guise of common law
unfair competition and emphasizing the unique qualities of plaintiff's voice
(voice imitation was of a duck)).
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pansion of publicity rights by the courts.53 Courts have ex-
panded the right of publicity in two general ways: by
broadening the traditional reading of "name" and "likeness" to
include such things as nicknames, drawings, and celebrity look-
alikes,54 or by going beyond the Prosser formulation of name
and likeness (and many state statutes based on the Prosser ele-
ments) 55 by including characteristics such as vocal idiosyncra-
sies within a more general formulation of "identity."56
This second line of cases extending identity beyond the
name or likeness formula may be divided into two further sub-
categories. The first sub-category encompasses cases extending
identity based on some personal aspect of the celebrity being ex-
ploited.57 Personal aspect cases often involve individuals imi-
tating a celebrity's voice or other characteristic. 58 These cases
53. The expansion has been particularly evident in the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. See Kent, supra note 11.
54. E.g., Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 630 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (granting famous film maker's request for injunction preventing use of a
look-alike in commercial); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (enjoining magazine from distributing copies that included nude portraits
of former heavyweight boxing champion); Apple Corp. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1015, 1017 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1986) (applying New York law,
and finding that "Beatlemania" production featuring look-alike performers of
famous rock group violated band members' rights); Onassis v. Christian Dior-
New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 263 (1984) (issuing injunction against Jac-
queline Onassis look-alike for appearance in commercial); Hirsch v. S.C. John-
son & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 130 (Wis. 1979) (finding a cause of action in
the unauthorized use of plaintiff's nickname "Crazylegs").
55. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 3344 (West 1994) (creating a cause of action
for use of another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness for advertis-
ing, selling, or solicitation purposes).
56. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th
Cir. 1992) (criticizing any limit in the number or type of factors that comprise
identity in the common law right of publicity), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443
(1993); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (expanding
the attributes of identity to voice in the case of a famous singer); Mot-
schenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974)
(holding that the peculiar markings of a race car driver's automobile were
within the scope of his protected identity).
57. E.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992) (pro-
tecting a well-known singer's identity as embodied in his voice); Midler, 849
F.2d at 460 (noting that the human voice is one of the most identifiable traits of
certain celebrities). For purposes of this analysis, a look-alike actor appropriat-
ing all aspects of a celebrity's identity will be categorized as a facet of the "like-
ness" cases. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (expanding the
interpretation of "name" and "likeness" to include portraits, look-alikes, and
noted nicknames); see also Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 612 (debating the question of
whether picture of look-alike actor could constitute plaintiff's "likeness").
58. The Ninth Circuit, applying California law, has twice recently passed
on the question of voice imitators: Midler, 849 F.2d at 460, and Waits, 978 F.2d
1994]
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present a particularly strong argument for the right of publicity,
because a voice or other imitation may deprive the celebrity of
direct income and entertainment opportunities by offering the
advantage of the celebrity's recognition at a bargain price.5 9
at 1093. The facts of Midler follow. Upon Bette Midler's refusal to sing an ed-
ited version of her song "Do You Want to Dance" in Ford's commercial, Ford's
advertising agency sought out one of Midler's backup singers, and instructed
her to "sound as much as possible like the Bette Midler record." 849 F.2d at
461. She was so successful that Midler sued. The court, in reversing a lower
court grant of summary judgment, stated that Midler had a valid common law
right of publicity action: "A voice is as distinctive and personal as a face. The
human voice is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested.... To
impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity." Id. at 463. The court limited its
new right only to "professional singer[s] [whose voice] is widely known and is
deliberately imitated in order to sell a product." Id.
The Waits court applied the Midler decision to similar facts: a well-known
singer, Tom Waits, was imitated after refusing to sing for a commercial. 978
F.2d at 1097-98. The Waits court expanded on the Midler holding by offering a
"common sense" definition of the requirement that a voice must be "distinctive"
for protection, id. at 1102, and stated that the imitation must be of something
more than the performer's "style." Id. at 1101. The Waits court also let stand a
lower court award of mental distress damages based on Waits' idealistic opposi-
tion to his music being used in commercials, id. at 1103, as opposed to the Mid-
ler court's award only of compensatory pecuniary damages.
59. The appropriation of a celebrity's performance value has been distin-
guished from a celebrity's commercial value by one commentator and termed
the "right of performance." Madow, supra note 13, at 208 n.395.
An analogy to fair use parody doctrine is illustrative of the difference be-
tween the right of publicity and the right of performance. In parody, one dis-
positive question is whether the parody fulfills the demand for the original
work. If so, it is directly competing with the original and not a "fair use" under
copyright law. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1176
(1994); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Beth Warnken
Van Hecke, Note, But Seriously Folks: Toward a Coherent Standard of Parody
as Fair Use, 77 MINN. L. REv. 465, 486-87 (1992) (arguing that whether a par-
ody is a fair use should depend entirely on whether the parody is capable of
serving as a substitute for the original work). Analogously, a mimic may be
seen as fulfilling the demand for the original performer, thus infringing on his
right of performance. By fulfilling this demand, the mimic is infringing on the
performer's direct commercial opportunities, rather than the collateral rights
protected by the right of publicity.
The Supreme Court's only true right of publicity decision, Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1976), is best viewed as a right
of performance decision, although of a variety not involving a mimic. In this
case, a "human cannonball" performer noticed a reporter at his performance,
and asked him not to film it. The reporter filmed the entire 15-second sequence
of the performer being shot from a cannon, which was broadcast in its entirety
on the local evening news, albeit with favorable comment encouraging viewers
to see the performance. Id. at 563-64. The Court stated,
[T]he broadcast of petitioner's entire performance, unlike the unau-
thorized use of another's name for purposes of trade or the incidental
use of a name or picture by the press, goes to the heart of petitioner's
ability to earn a living as an entertainer. Thus, in this case, Ohio has
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The second sub-category consists of cases that extend iden-
tity based on the "trappings" that surround and enforce a celeb-
rity's identity, the "penumbras" of identity.60 This sub-category
of identity cases extends the right of publicity to cover various
indicia of identity not involving a plaintiff's personal character-
istics.61 These cases hold that the touchstone of a right of pub-
licity violation is that the plaintiffs identity be "evoked" for a
commercial use.6 2 This evocation of identity does not rely upon
recognized what may be the strongest case for a "right of publicity"-
involving, not the appropriation of an entertainer's reputation to en-
hance the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropria-
tion of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his
reputation in the first place.
Id. at 576.
60. E.g., White, 971 F.2d at 1395; Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets,
Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach,
Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (1977).
61. See supra note 57 (examining a celebrity's right to performance).
62. An early Ninth Circuit case, Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974), extended a famous race car driver's identity to
cover his distinctly-marked race car. Defendant tobacco company used footage
of this distinctive car, with some markings slightly changed, in a television
commercial without permission. Id. at 824. Although plaintiff was driving the
car, his features were not visible. Id. at 827. In reversing a lower court sum-
mary judgment ruling, the court held that the totality of circumstances made it
clear that viewers would likely infer that plaintiff was driving the car due to its
distinctiveness. Id. at 827. Although one commentator has described this case
as the "most radical extension of [identity] protection," Heatherington, supra
note 13, at 10, it actually seems to be only an incremental step, as it is clear the
commercial's implication was that plaintiff was driving the car and thus endors-
ing the product.
This implication is absent from two further extensions of the identity con-
cept, Lombardo, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 661, and Carson, 698 F.2d at 831. In
Lombardo, well-known New Year's Eve personality Guy Lombardo sued for in-
fringement of his identity as "Mr. New Year's Eve." 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664. The
defendant's offending car commercial featured "a New Year's Eve party with all
the usual trappings, including services of an actor conducting a band and utiliz-
ing the same gestures, musical beat and choice of music with which plaintiff
had become associated in the public mind." Id. at 662. The music in question
was "Auld Lang Syne," which in conjunction with balloons and party hats
"might amount to an exploitation of that carefully and painstakingly built pub-
lic personality." Id. at 664. There is no mention in the opinion about whether
the commercial was deceiving, or that the actor was mimicking Guy Lombardo
in a way likely to convince viewers that it actually was Guy Lombardo. Rather,
the mere presence of the "trappings" of a New Year's Eve party, with which Guy
Lombardo's public personality was associated, was enough in this court's eyes
to constitute a valid cause of action.
The facts of Here's Johnny are somewhat similar. In this case, a toilet com-
pany marketed "Here's Johnny" portable toilets in a takeoff on the phrase used
to introduce Carson as the host of "The Tonight Show." Carson, 698 F.2d at
832-33. The company also used the slogan "The World's Foremost Commodian"
to market the toilets. 698 F.2d at 833. The court reversed a lower court dismis-
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a realistic rendering of the plaintiff; rather, the evocation must
somehow remind the audience of the plaintiff.63 This is accom-
plished through use of those surroundings of celebrity identity
that reinforce the celebrity's semiotic message, thus reinforcing
who the celebrity is to the audience. 64
D. WzhTE: CURRENT RIGHT OF PUBLICITY DocTRINE's OUTER
Lnwrrs
White provides a clear picture of current right of publicity
doctrine. Although White touches upon each category of cases
extending identity beyond the name or likeness formula, White
most clearly fits within the celebrity-trappings genre.65 White
represents the farthest extension yet of celebrity identity,
clearly continuing the trend of protecting all indicia of
celebrity. 66
The Ninth Circuit sustained White's cause of action under
the California common law right of publicity.67 The court held
sal of Carson's suit, holding that, even though the phrase did not identify Car-
son, use his likeness or any aspect of his personality, or imply that Carson
endorsed or had any association with the product, it nonetheless appropriated
his identity. Id. The court stated, "We believe that... [this] conception of the
right of publicity is too narrow." Id. at 835.
Thus, both New Year's Eve and a phrase used to introduce a celebrity are
privatized as aspects of celebrity identity. It is not known by the author
whether the phrase "Here's Johnny" has been copyrighted by the producers or
owners of the program, but this adds an interesting twist to the right of public-
ity that will be discussed in light of the White case in part II, infra. Cf. Balti-
more Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 674
(7th Cir. 1986) (holding that baseball players' right of publicity interest in their
televised baseball performances is subsumed by baseball team owners' copy-
right protection in the same televised performances, and is thus preempted by
federal law), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987).
63. The White court dismissed the proposition that some characteristic of
the plaintiff actually be realistically represented as "merely challenging] the
clever advertising strategist" to come up with a new way to "eviscerate" celebri-
ties' rights. White, 971 F.2d at 1398-99.
64. This would include the setting upon which the celebrity usually per-
forms, the phrase generally used to introduce the celebrity, or a costume associ-
ated with the celebrity's public role.
65. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing the extension
of identity to include all factors that tend to remind the audience of the
celebrity).
66. See supra note 50 (acknowledging the expansion of protected identity to
virtually all traits as references of celebrity).
67. 971 F.2d at 1399. White alleged three distinct causes of action: Cali-
fornia Civil Code § 3344 (West 1994), the California common law right of pub-
licity, and § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988) (establishing a
cause of action for using false descriptions or representations of a celebrity that
tend to confuse the audience over whether that celebrity has endorsed a prod-
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that a prior statement of the elements necessary to plead a right
of publicity cause of action,68 under which White's cause of ac-
tion would have been insufficient, was not meant to be exclu-
sive.6 9 The court stated that the "name or likeness"7 0 element
was merely an account of the prior cases recognizing the right of
publicity, and stemmed from the early Prosser formulation of
the right.71 Expanding upon Prosser's role in forming the right
of publicity, the court noted that Prosser himself had observed
that cases involving actions beyond appropriation of a name or
likeness might one day emerge. 72
uct). Section 3344(a) of the California Civil Code provides, in pertinent part,
that "[amny person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness, in any manner,... for purposes of advertising or selling ...
without such person's prior consent ... shall be liable for any damages sus-
tained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof." CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 3344 (West 1994). Section 3344's plain language presented an enormous hur-
dle for White, who sued for damages for the use of a clearly mechanical robot in
an advertisement. As the statute limited recovery to the use of a celebrity's
name or likeness, and the robot did not in any way resemble White, 971 F.2d at
1397, the court gave White's § 3344 claim short shrift and affirmed the lower
court's dismissal. Id. The court stated: "Without deciding for all purposes
when a caricature or impressionistic resemblance might become a 'likeness,' we
agree with the district court that the robot at issue here was not White's 'like-
ness' within the meaning of section 3344." Id. This clearly cements White's
position outside the "likeness" line of cases. See supra notes 54-64 and accom-
panying text (describing likeness cases).
68. Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
The elements are, "(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the ap-
propriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commer-
cially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury." Id. (citation
omitted).
69. The White court seized upon the Eastwood court's statement that in-
fringement of the right of publicity "may be alleged" by pleading the elements
listed in note 68, supra. 971 F.2d at 1397 (citing Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at
342) (emphasis added).
70. See supra note 68 (listing the four elements of infringement of the right
of publicity).
71. White, 971 F.2d at 1397.
72. "'It is not impossible that there might be appropriation of the plain-
tiff's identity, as by impersonation, without the use of either his name or his
likeness, and that this would be an invasion of his right of privacy.'" 971 F.2d
at 1397-98 (quoting Prosser, supra note 28, at 401 n.155). Prosser gives the
example of impersonation, recognized in prior Ninth Circuit decisions. This
statement is in line with the cases recognizing imitation or use of some personal
aspect of the plaintiff, but does not seem to endorse the "trappings" genre of
cases. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing cases ex-
tending identity based on "trappings" surrounding and enforcing a celebrity's
identity).
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The court buttressed its reasoning by synthesizing two pre-
vious federal cases, one from the Ninth Circuit 73 and the other
from the Sixth Circuit7 4 :
These cases teach not only that the common law right of publicity
reaches means of appropriation other than name or likeness, but that
the specific means of appropriation are relevant only for determining
whether the defendant has in fact appropriated the plaintiff's identity.
The right of publicity does not require that appropriations of identity
be accomplished through particular means to be actionable. 75
The court reasoned that the "means" used to accomplish the
identity appropriation were not important, just the appropria-
tion itself.76 Making the manner of appropriation dispositive,
the court said, would "eviscerate" the right of publicity.77
An important aspect of this case is Samsung's First Amend-
ment defense. Samsung argued that the First Amendment pro-
tects the commercial as a parody of Vanna White. 78 The court
summarily dealt with this argument in one paragraph, stating
that commercial speech cannot qualify for the parody defense. 7 9
73. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1974); see supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing Motschenbacher
and other cases extending the identity concept).
74. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983); see supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing Here's Johnny and
how Carson's identity had been appropriated).
75. 971 F.2d at 1398. The court noted that neither case involved use of the
plaintiff's name or likeness, and further reasoned that in Motschenbacher "the
driver could have been an actor or dummy and the analysis would have been
the same." Id.
76. Id. at 1399.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1401. Parody, a defense available under the fair use doctrine,
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988), is generally applied in copyright infringe-
ment cases. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing fair use par-
ody doctrine and the difference between right of publicity and right of
performance). It is perhaps indicative of this case's reach that the defense is
being applied against a person not capable of holding a copyright in what is
being infringed. See Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). Sam-
sung cited Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 99 (1988), and L.L.
Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987), to support its
defense. Brief for Appellee at 17, White (No. 90-55840). For further discussion
of the parody defense, see Van Hecke, supra note 59 at 486-87.
79. Although noting that celebrity identity can be invoked for "expressive"
purposes, the court stated that any expressive content in the ad is "only tangen-
tially related to the ad's primary message: 'buy Samsung VCRs.'" White, 971
F.2d at 1401.
The test for whether so-called "commercial speech" qualifies for First
Amendment protection is found in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). White does not attempt to apply the
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The court concludes, "[t]he difference between a 'parody' and a
'knock-off' is the difference between fun and profit."80
II. CELEBRITY RIGHTS AT THE PUBLIC'S EXPENSE:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT
OF PUBLICITY
White continues a long line of precedent supporting a celeb-
rity's right to control the use of his or her image in society with-
out analyzing the conclusory reasons behind such a right, or
taking into account the costs such a right may impose upon pop-
ular culture. Courts have failed to analyze the traditional ratio-
nales cited for the right of publicity.8 ' Furthermore, these
courts have not harmonized right of publicity protection with
traditional intellectual property law, and have failed to take into
account the nature of the relationship between celebrity and au-
dience.8 2 In place of the current right of publicity, courts should
establish a relatively narrow right that protects the celebrity
only from infringement upon the celebrity's performance
identity.8 3
A. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY HAS OUTGROWN ITS LIMITED
RATIONALES
1. Traditional Right of Publicity Justifications Are
Unpersuasive
The argument that one becomes famous only through enor-
mous expenditures of time, talent, energy, finances, and other
resources, the "property" or "moral" rationale, is not always ac-
curate.8 4 With few exceptions, however, courts do not challenge
these assertions.8 5
test, but cites the case to stand for the general proposition that commercial
speech receives less protection than non-commercial speech. 971 F.2d at 1401.
80. White, 971 F.2d at 1401. This so-called "difference between fun and
profit" and the distinctions that may truly be drawn between commercial and
non-commercial speech will be dealt with in part II, infra.
81. For an explanation of these rationales, see supra notes 36-45 and ac-
companying text.
82. The so-called "cult of celebrity" is, after all, merely another form of pop-
art in today's society. This concept will be further developed infra.
83. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (distinguishing between the
rights of publicity and performance).
84. For an explanation of the property rationale, see supra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text.
85. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.
1980); supra note 42 (challenging the notion that fame is due to a celebrity's
hard work).
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Certainly, many celebrities have worked very hard to
achieve their position. The property rationale, however, ignores
two factors: first, many unknown entertainers expend similar
resources developing abilities that are equal to or better than
those of celebrities, and never receive the compensation this ex-
clusive right bestows only on those already famous.8 6 More im-
portantly, the property rationale fails to account for the
serendipitous and unpredictable influence of the public and me-
dia on who becomes a celebrity. 7 A celebrity's hard work alone
is not enough; somehow the media must pick up on the image
and disseminate it, and the celebrity must somehow appeal to
the vagaries of public taste at that moment.88 Any rights cre-
ated through this process should thus belong to the public, at
least in proportion to their contribution, and a complete priva-
tization of these rights is actually an infringement upon the pub-
lic's moral rights.
The public's role in the image-making process is woefully
underemphasized by courts. In the end, it is the public that de-
termines a celebrity's role and image in our popular culture,
guided to some extent by the media and the "star-making" in-
dustry. Public choice may destroy or make irrelevant even the
most carefully maintained image.8 9 Additionally, the most un-
deserving personalities can be thrust into the national spotlight,
86. Compare the time practicing, resources spent on lessons, schooling, in-
struments, and other equipment, and financial sacrifices necessary to become a
classical cellist with the Hollywood romance of the young star being "discov-
ered" in a diner.
87. A corollary argument is that, given the influence of agents, publicists,
producers, script writers, and other tools of the star-making machine, many or
even most celebrities are not the ones performing whatever hard work does go
into making their image.
88. The case of the "Where's the beef" woman, Clara Peller, is illustrative.
"Peller became a household name and face by virtue of her 'Where's the beef'
series of commercials for Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers in the early
1980s." Heatherington, supra note 13, at 26 n.163. The Wendy's commercials
featuring the formerly obscure senior citizen went so far as to "influence the
1984 Democratic nomination process." Id. Former Vice President Walter
Mondale challenged nomination rival Gary Harts platform of "new ideas" by
demanding to know "Where's the beef?", the phrase made famous by Peller.
This further exposure of the curmudgeony Peller and her famous catch-phrase
cemented Peller and "Where's the beef" in the public mind and our political
history. Id. (supporting the right of publicity).
Whatever Peller's talents may be, and whether these commercials fully dis-
played them, it is clear that, of all the factors contributing to Peller's fame, her
talents are the least noteworthy. It rather seems, as is so often the case, that
she was in the right place at the right time.
89. E.g., rap star Vanilla Ice, who burst onto the music scene and sold mil-
lions of records, but quickly became a national joke.
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with resulting endorsement revenues.9 0 To take proper account
of these factors, courts allocating publicity rights based upon a
property rationale would seemingly have to divide these rights
between celebrities, the public, and the media on a case-by-case
basis. 91 Courts, however, see only the supposed contributions to
fame of celebrity plaintiffs, ignoring the public's influence and
resulting moral rights.9 2
As it stands, the right of publicity is almost entirely a celeb-
rity doctrine.93 Obviously, the only names, likenesses, and other
factors of identity that have a market value worth protecting are
those that are already known.9 4 The right of publicity thus
serves to concentrate control of celebrity identity with the celeb-
rity, and does not contribute to the development of any new or
90. E.g., Jessica Hahn, thrust into tabloids, music videos, and magazines
for her much-publicized affair with a popular televangelist. Examples from to-
day's headlines would include California's Menendez brothers and Tonya
Harding.
91. In an interview predating her right of publicity litigation, Vanna White
stated:
I think the reason I'm getting so much attention is, first, the show is so
popular... I've never really spoken about this, and I'm trying to figure
it out myself. I don't know why this has happened to me. I work hard
and I'm dedicated, but overall I'm totally surprised. What did I do to
deserve this? I count my blessings all the time, but in five years, ten
years, who's Vanna White?
Dan Hurley, The End of Celebrity, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Dec. 1988, at 55. White is
befuddled by her own celebrity; ignoring all the reasons cited by courts in right
of publicity cases, she instead attributes it to "Wheel of Fortune's" popularity
and her own good luck.
92. The White court has taken this one step further. Rather than worry
about a moral justification for the right of publicity, the court states, "The law
protects the celebrity's sole right to exploit this value whether the celebrity has
achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a combination thereof."
White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
93. See, e.g., Appellant's Reply Brief at 10, White (No. 90-55840) ("It is pre-
cisely Ms. White's celebrity status, however, that the law is designed to pro-
tect."); see also Madow, supra note 13, at 174 (describing Melville Nimmer's
seminal article, see supra note 27, as "a high-class form of special-interest
pleading for the star image industry").
94. It is because celebrities are known quantities to the public that adver-
tisers and other potential users wish to associate with or otherwise build upon
celebrity identity. It is the identity's semiotic, message-bearing power that is
being exploited. If the public does not recognize the image, there is nothing
with which to carry the user's message.
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different meaning or culture through that identity.9 5 This may
be called a "privatization" of popular culture.
96
The market saturation justification9 7 similarly does not
withstand analysis. This rationale is crucial to proving damages
in some right of publicity cases.98 Once again, courts cite this
argument in a conclusory manner, without determining whether
a market is actually being, or even capable of being, saturated.99
95. This is because once an identity has become valuable, a celebrity will
vigorously resist any use that would tend to diminish that value. By granting
control of one's identity to the celebrity, the right of publicity artificially freezes
the identity's development. This will be discussed further through the concept
of "preferred meaning," infra.
96. This concept is analogous to the result of a Supreme Court decision,
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522 (1987), where the United States Olympic Committee sued a San Francisco
organization to enjoin the organization from promoting an event known as the
"Gay Olympics." Rather than conventional trademark protection, which re-
quires the likelihood of confusion on the part of consumers, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(a) (1988), the USOC relied on a specific grant from Congress in the Ama-
teur Sports Act, 46 U.S.C. § 380 (1988), of near exclusive commercial use of the
word "Olympic." 483 U.S. at 526. The Court held, "Congress intended to pro-
vide the USOC with exclusive control of the use of the word 'Olympic' without
regard to whether an unauthorized use of the word tends to cause confusion."
Id. at 530. The court further stated that allowing traditional trademark de-
fenses in this case would render the Amateur Sports Act "superfluous." Id.
In language making the right of publicity analogy even more apparent, the
court stated, "[lilt is clear that the SFAA sought to exploit the 'commercial mag-
netism' of the word given value by the USOC." Id. at 539 (citation omitted).
Thus, the case can be said to stand for the proposition that Congress has the
power to take a word "off the market," just as the right of publicity can be said
to privatize a celebrity's development of his or her own image.
97. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing the market
saturation justification).
98. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (sus-
taining a market saturation award based on expert witness testimony); Lahr v.
Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962) (arguing that a plaintiff's market
may be curtailed by a defendans conduct tending to saturate that market).
Waits presents an especially interesting market analysis situation. First, the
court affirmed a jury award to Waits for injury to "peace, happiness and feel-
ings," 978 F.2d at 1103, because commercial endorsements were "particularly
offensive to Waits." Id. The court then proceeded to state that "if Waits ever
wanted to do a commercial in the future, the fee he could command would be
lowered by $50,000 to $150,000 because of the Doritos commercial." Id. at 1104.
The court thus sustained a market saturation award of $75,000 to Waits, based
on expert witness testimony. Id.
99. See, e.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 138
(Wis. 1979) ("The economic damage caused by unauthorized commercial use of a
name [may include] the dilution of the value of the name in authorized adver-
tising."); see also McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 11.8(B), at 11-43 to 11-47 (outlin-
ing the market saturation rationale and citing cases). From a common-sense
perspective, it would appear that awarding specific damages based on a celeb-
rity's future market is speculative at best, due to our popular culture's
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Related to this argument is the underlying assumption that
eliminating the right of publicity would deprive celebrities of a
substantial amount of money.100 This argument, however, as-
sumes that only the law's protection imbues a celebrity's image
with value. Although portions of a celebrity's identity would be-
come available for use by artists and entertainers absent legal
protection, the celebrity himself could still command substantial
endorsement power. After all, the raison d'etre for a "celebrity
endorsement" is, in fact, the celebrity's endorsement. Large ad-
vertisers would continue to pay substantial endorsement money
to have celebrities actually endorse or use their products, as well
as act in their commercials.101
The economic incentive argument 0 2 also fails in the real
world. To say that the right of publicity is necessary to en-
courage people to became famous athletes or entertainers is to
completely ignore the primary rewards gained by one who has
become famous and to set up the collateral rewards as the pri-
mary motivation.10 3 Those who posit the incentive argument
would have us believe that the million dollar salary of an NBA
draft pick (or other entertainer) is not enough to ensure an ade-
mercurial nature. Additionally, a markets capacity for saturation would ap-
pear to differ with each celebrity, rendering it difficult to lay down any concrete
principles for determining when a market could be saturated.
100. See Madow, supra note 13, at 208-211; see also supra note 45 and ac-
companying text (discussing how free access to a celebrity's identity destroys its
value).
101. For example, even without a right of publicity Michael Jordan would
still be in demand to dunk basketballs on television, his recent retirement
notwithstanding. A commercial such as Jordan's Superbowl Sunday extrava-
ganza with Bugs Bunny would not be possible without Jordan's consent and
active participation, whatever the status of right of publicity law. Moreover,
even without a right of publicity advertisers would be prevented by false adver-
tising law from misleading consumers that a recalcitrant celebrity endorses
their product. See, e.g., McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 5.4[A], at 5-24 n.1.2 ("Where
there is no false endorsement, it is an exercise in futility to try to cram the
claim for legal recovery into false advertising law .... ).
102. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing whether eco-
nomic incentives drive creation of celebrity images).
103. As the Sixth Circuit once stated,
Although fame and stardom may be ends in themselves, they are nor-
mally by-products of one's activities and personal attributes, as well as
luck and promotion. The basic motivations are the desire to achieve
success or excellence in a chosen field, the desire to contribute to the
happiness or improvement of one's fellows and the desire to receive the
psychic and financial rewards of achievement.
Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1980).
Contra Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-77
(1976) (arguing that financial incentives encourage output that has public bene-
fits); supra note 59 (discussing the right of publicity and the Zachinni decision).
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quate flow of talent into this field. This argument assumes that
only the addition of the shoe endorsement contract will attract
the correct mix of ability.10 4
2. Celebrity Protections Stifle Cultural Growth and
Contradict Traditional Intellectual Property Law
Protecting celebrity images may actually stifle real cultural
growth. Although constituting only an indirect source of income
to those already famous,105 exploitation of celebrity identity'0 6
constitutes a direct source of revenue to such entertainers and
artists as satirists, cartoonists, comedians, and advertisers,' °7
among others. The right of publicity discourages these artists
while failing to provide additional incentive to celebrities, 0 8 di-
rectly contravening the policy behind intellectual property law
of stimulating creative output.'0 9
Additionally, the right of publicity elevates private benefits
to the exclusion of public rights, further contradicting tradi-
tional intellectual property law."10 Implicit in other intellectual
property protections is the notion that the rights exist to serve
104. The elimination of any economic incentive may operate on the margins
to deter entry into any particular field. The right of publicity, however, is the
exclusive domain of the elite and powerful few. Only those already command-
ing millions of dollars in direct income are likely to attract even minimal oppor-
tunities for celebrity endorsement. Thus, the disincentive on those not already
famous is indirect, and likely de minimis. Also, it may be that, particularly in
the case of athletics, there is an oversupply of talent attempting to occupy a
very small number of positions in the public eye, to the exclusion of other, more
socially rewarding pursuits. See Madow, supra note 13, at 216-17 (discussing
whether the rewards of celebrity draw too much effort and aspiration into fields
where only a few can succeed).
105. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text (arguing that only
those commanding millions of dollars in direct income are likely to attract even
minimal opportunities for celebrity endorsements).
106. Exploitation of celebrity identity is a crucial element of today's popular
culture.
107. The commercial/non-commercial speech distinction will be dealt with
infra.
108. In other words, the celebrity's creative output will probably not be af-
fected by endorsement revenues. Rather, it will be attached to economic re-
wards flowing directly from creative pursuits. It may even be posited that the
right of publicity allows celebrities to rest on their laurels while feeding off of
publicity revenues, thus directly discouraging further creative output.
109. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the policy be-
hind intellectual property law). Under federal copyright and patent law, a com-
prehensive scheme is already in place to protect the same incentives supposedly
protected by the right of publicity.
110. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the fortui-
tousness of fame and the rationale underlying intellectual property law).
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the public, and that the public eventually will control its prod-
ucts. 1 ' The right of publicity, however, attempts to hold celeb-
rity image from the public domain for as long as possible,
yielding only to public influence with the utmost reluctance. 112
Furthermore, cultural development that opposes prevalent
beliefs is exactly the type of cultural development we should en-
courage. Artists and others who exploit celebrity identities are
likely to challenge the "preferred meanings" 113 of these identi-
ties. Celebrities, by contrast, attempt to preserve the status quo
and thus their own incomes, 114 to cultural development's detri-
ment.115 The Samsung advertisement can be seen in this light
as a satirization of White and the entire modern process of be-
coming a celebrity. By replacing White with a robot, it com-
ments on the interchangeable, generic, talentless nature of
celebrity in general and possibly Vanna White in particular."16
The joke behind the ad is the implication that Vanna White can
be replaced with a robot. Requiring permission for this type of
use would effectively eliminate this critical comment from our
culture, because White and other celebrities are not likely to al-
low unsympathetic uses of their identities. Requiring the sati-
111. See supra note 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale
underlying intellectual property law).
112. For instance, the governor of Minnesota recently signed into law a bill
banning the sale of "Crazy Horse Malt Liquor," an alcoholic beverage named
after the late 19th century Lakota leader. Gou. Bans Crazy Horse Malt Liquor,
USA TODAY, Int'l Edition, May 12, 1994, at 8B. Crazy Horse has been dead for
over a century, but his image is still vigilantly protected against offensive
meanings. Id.
113. See infra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing preferred
meaning).
114. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text (arguing that celebri-
ties rest on their laurels while feeding off publicity revenues).
115. A recent exhibition at the Minneapolis Institute of Arts provides a
trenchant example of artistic use of a celebrity's identity. Kira Obolensky,
Nightmare at the Helmsley Palace, ARTs, Dec. 1992, at 8-10. This exhibit con-
sisted entirely of photographer Judith Yourman's photographs and multimedia
representations of hotel magnate and infamous celebrity tax evader Leona
Helmsley. Id. The exhibits, ranging from Helmsley depicted in surreal colors
and situations to black and white video of Helmsley at trial, combined to create
a unique comment upon one element of our society. Id. The exhibit also high-
lighted the sensationalistic nature of media coverage and its relationship to the
legal system through representations of Helmsley's trial and the media cover-
age it generated, implicating our legal system as just another element of the
popular culture. Id. Clearly, Helmsley would not have given her permission for
this if required, and our culture would be damaged.
116. White has been called "one of the more inexplicable celebrities in the
history of fame." Hurley, supra note 91, at 50.
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rist to use White herself in the ad is similarly unsatisfactory,
because it totally destroys any satirical effect."17
3. The Right of Publicity Contradicts Copyright Law
Conspicuously absent from right of publicity law is any "fair
use" doctrine modeled after copyright law."18 Recognizing that
cultural development is a linear process building upon the work
of those who have come before," 19 Congress and the courts have
created fair use as a limitation on intellectual property protec-
tion. This limitation allows socially desirable uses of otherwise
protected ideas. The fair use exception recognizes that absolute
protection of ideas is actually contrary to copyright law's
purpose. 120
The fact that White is based on the "trappings of celebrity"
line of cases12 ' raises additional problems with copyright law.
None of the identifying aspects cited by the court is personal to
Vanna White. 122 The court cites the mock "Wheel of Fortune"
117. This decision, however, would seem to be the course of action mandated
by the right of publicity, short of not producing the ad. Samsung had a tenta-
tive ad featuring former president Richard Nixon's face cn a dollar bill with the
caption "Dollar bill 2025 A.D.," but cancelled the ad after Nixon refused permis-
sion. Samsung Has Seen the Future: Brace Yourself, ADWEEK, Oct. 3, 1988, at
26. This ad targeted a well-aimed barb at Nixon revisionism, but is now lost to
our culture due to the right of publicity's chill wind.
118. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing fair use).
119. After all, it would be unreasonable to expect every author, artist, inven-
tor, or other creative person to in effect "reinvent the wheel" every time they
begin a new project. Exemplifying how "derivative" work can contribute to our
culture, photographer Cindy Sherman actually bases her entire body of work on
prior artists' portraits. Each of her pictures presents a famous portrait by a
traditional artist. Each portraits subject, however, is Sherman herself, cos-
tumed to almost exactly resemble the original. This technique results in sur-
prisingly biting and topical comments on art history and past social conventions
and mores, yet is built entirely on past artists' work. Representative samples of
Sherman's work are on file with the author.
120. See Van Hecke, supra note 59, at 468; see also White v. Samsung Elec.
Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir.) (Koziuski, J., dissenting to denial of
rehearing en banc) ("Private land.., is far more useful if separated from other
private land by public streets, roads and highways. Public parks, utility rights-
of-way and sewers reduce the amount of land in private hands, but vastly en-
hance the value of the property that remains. So too it is with intellectual prop-
erty."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
121. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing the "trap-
pings of celebrity" line of cases).
122. The White court itself acknowledged,
Viewed separately, the individual aspects of the advertisement in the
present case say little. Viewed together, they leave little doubt about
the celebrity the ad is meant to depict. The female-shaped robot is
wearing a long gown, blond wig and large jewelry. Vanna White
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set itself as the dispositive factor identifying the robot as Vanna
White.' 23 Vanna White's property right in this trapping of her
identity, however, is actually the "Wheel of Fortune" owner's
copyrighted intellectual property.
Vanna White is thus suing under a cause of action based on
appropriation of someone else's federally copyrighted property.
Although this would not seemingly run afoul of federal preemp-
tion doctrine, 124 it does interfere with rights protected by the
federal copyright scheme.' 25
White and other "trappings" cases are additionally vulnera-
ble because the trappings used to evoke the celebrity's identity
may not exclusively identify one celebrity, particularly if the
trappings are another person's protected intellectual prop-
erty.' 26 For example, after reciting the copyrighted factors in
the ad that bring Vanna White to mind, the court stated that
dresses like this at times, but so do many other women. The robot is in
the process of turning a block letter on a game-board. Vanna White
dresses like this while turning letters on a game-board but perhaps
similarly-attired Scrabble-playing women do this as well. The robot is
standing on what looks like the Wheel of Fortune game show set.
Vanna White dresses like this, turns letters, and does this on the
Wheel of Fortune game show. She is the only one. Indeed, defendants
themselves referred to their ad as the "Vanna White" ad. We are not
surprised.
971 F.2d at 1399.
123. See supra notes 60-64 (discussing the "trappings of celebrity" line of
cases). Minus this factor, none of the other characteristics cited by the court
would identify the robot as Vanna White. Even without the other factors, how-
ever, anyone posed on the set of "Wheel of Fortune" turning a letter would re-
mind the viewer of Vanna White.
124. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 677 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that players' rights to publicity
are within the subject matter of copyright and so are preempted by federal law).
The principal distinction is that the baseball players in this case were suing for
publicity rights in their televised performances in copyrighted baseball games,
whereas Vanna White is suing for performance rights outside of the specific
"Wheel of Fortune" broadcast, although based on material contained within
that broadcast.
125. See White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting to denial of re-
hearing en banc) ("In a case where the copyright owner isn't even a party-
where no one has the interests of copyright holders at heart-the majority cre-
ates a rule that greatly diminishes the rights of copyright holders in this cir-
cuit."). For a discussion of federal preemption doctrine as applied to the right of
publicity in general, see Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that right of publicity is not preempted). It is worth noting,
however, that Waits, as contrasted with White, did not involve a suit on identity
aspects protected under federal copyright law. Id.
126. See supra note 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing the "trap-
pings" advertisers use to evoke images of particular celebrities).
1994] 509
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:485
she is the "only" person thus identified. 127 Vanna White, how-
ever, may be replaced. 128 If the show's owners/producers re-
place Vanna White with another letter-turner, the newly-
created celebrity would assume White's position and responsibil-
ities on the program. This person would enjoy all the benefits
gained from White's efforts and talents, as well as all the "trap-
pings" noted by the court as identifying White in the ad.129 In
other words, the new letter-turner is a "free rider" and "reaping
where others have sown."130 If this new letter-turner were to
exploit this serendipitous fame in commercials, posing on
"Wheel of Fortune's" set, 131 she would violate White's right of
publicity as stated by the Ninth Circuit. It is equally clear, how-
ever, that the right of publicity should not be construed so as to
give a celebrity total control over a certain genre of roles, 132 or to
constrain copyright holders in how they dispose of copyrighted
material. White, as this example demonstrates, lends itself to
such an untenable expansion. 133
127. 971 F.2d at 1399.
128. Relatedly, White is also not the show's original hostess; this honor be-
longs to Susan Stafford, who hosted the show from its premier on January 6,
1975, until the fall of 1982. Appellee's Brief at 3, White (No. 90-55840). The
subsequent analysis in the text would also apply to Stafford were she to per-
form endorsements on a mock "Wheel of Fortune" set.
129. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing the line of
cases extending identity based on the "trappings" that surround celebrity
status).
130. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing the similarity
of the entitlement of celebrity status to the entitlement of a farmer to the pro-
duce of his or her fields).
131. The new letter-turner could possibly be sued by the show's copyright
holder.
132. See Nurmi v. Peterson, 10 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1775, 1778 (C.D. Cal. 1989)
(stating, in passing on suit by originator of "Vampira" character against similar
"Elvira" character, "because these allegations do not amount to the claim that
the plaintiff's actual features were used by the defendants for commercial pur-
poses, no common law right of publicity or privacy action can be maintained").
133. Further analogies can be drawn, such as allowing Clayton Moore an
exclusive right of publicity in the "Lone Ranger" role, or allowing Arnold
Schwarzenegger to sue Steven Seagal for invading his well-developed role of the
muscle-bound adventurer. Cf. Carlos V. Lozano, West Loses Lawsuit over Bat-
man TV Commercial, L.A. TIxMs, Jan. 18, 1990, at B3 (describing former "Bat-
man" actor's unsuccessful right of publicity lawsuit over TV commercial
produced under license from DC Comics, the Batman copyright holder).
Another interesting wrinkle would be presented if White were alive and
litigating when "Wheel of Fortune's" copyright expires, or if her heirs sued in a
jurisdiction where the right of publicity is descendible. At this time, the copy-
righted material contained in the show enters the public domain, and the public
is to have full access. The right of publicity, however, constrains these public
rights.
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B. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ARTIFICIALLY GRANTs PRIVATE
CONTROL OF PUBLIC IMAGE
The right of publicity unrealistically views the relationship
between art and audience, and, by analogy, celebrity and audi-
ence. This right violates the basic tenet that once a work of art
or other piece of popular culture134 enters the public domain, the
role of the artist or creator is largely over, and its meaning is
determined by the audience. 135 In addition, by elevating the
134. Celebrities certainly are a substantial part of modem popular culture.
"The fact that we have given Vanna White celebrity is a key to seeing our soci-
ety today. Stars often lead us into new social trends.... But very little serious
thinking or research has gone into this field. Which is amazing, considering
how important stars are to our society." Hurley, supra note 91, at 50 (quoting
Jib Fowles, professor of media studies at the University of Houston in Clear
Lake).
135. "Classification as art... does not rest solely on the intrinsic qualities of
the object, but on the assumptions of the viewer and the culture. Conferring
artistic status is an act based upon a social and institutional framework." Rob-
ert Silberman, What's Art and What's Not?, ARTs, at 8. The semiotic power
contained in celebrity identity, and exploited by the celebrity and other users,
can be seen as arriving at its meaning through the same, culturally-determined
process.
Italian author Italo Calvino has written on the dynamic relationship be-
tween artist and audience and the instillation of meaning into a work of art,
exemplified here by the relationship between author and reader:
I read in a book that the objectivity of thought can be expressed
using the verb "to think" in the impersonal third person: saying not "I
think" but "it thinks" as we say "it rains." There is thought in the uni-
verse-this is the constant from which we must set out every time.
Will I ever be able to say, "Today it writes," just like "Today it
rains," "Today it is windy"? Only when it will become natural to me to
use the verb "write" in the impersonal form will I be able to hope that
through me is expressed something less limited than the personality of
an individual.
And for the verb "to read"? Will we be able to say, "Today it reads"
as we say "Today it rains"? If you think about it, reading is necessarily
an individual act, far more than writing. If we assume that writing
manages to go beyond the limitations of the author, it will continue to
have a meaning only when it is read by a single person and passes
through his mental circuits. Only the ability to be read by a given indi-
vidual proves that what is written shares in the power of writing, a
power based on some-thing that goes beyond the individual. The uni-
verse will be able to express itself as long as somebody will be able to
say, "I read, therefore it writes."
ITALO CALVINO, IF ON A WINTER's NIGHT A TRAVELER 176 (William Weaver
trans., 1979). In Calvino's view, therefore, it is only the audience and the mean-
ing it attaches to a work that renders it "expression."
T.S. Eliot echoes the theme of artist as conduit for something beyond the
artist's self: "What happens is a continual surrender of [the artist] as he is at
the moment to something which is more valuable. The progress of an artist is a
continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality." T.S. ELIOT, SE-
LECTED EssAYs 17 (1972). The view of artistic creation posited by Calvino and
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commercial nature of the celebrity identity's use to dispositive
status, courts have created an artificial distinction that does not
exist in our world of audience-determined meaning.136
The idea of a celebrity attempting to control the develop-
ment of his or her own identity is illuminated by the concept of
"preferred meaning."13 7 The "preferred meaning" of a product,
celebrity, or other item is the meaning that the artist or celeb-
rity intends for the product of his labors, whether it be a work of
art or her own image, that also comports with the dominant ide-
ological view in society.138 The right of publicity acts to institu-
Eliot contrasts sharply with the self-aggrandizement inherent in the right of
publicity. This leads one back to the question of whether the right of publicity
actually protects or fosters any sort of creative impulse other than the desire to
remain a celebrity. Another writer reinforces this view, stating that the mod-
ern celebrity is "a person who is known for his well-knownness .... He is the
human pseudo-event." Hurley, supra note 91, at 52 (quoting Daniel J.
Boorstin).
136. Even commentators arguing for the right of publicity have noted that
"all but the most altruistic of pursuits and creations can be found to produce
income." Heatherington, supra note 13, at 31. As noted above, even commer-
cials can have satirical and other socially valuable content. Furthermore, com-
mercials often play a substantial part in forming the pop culture of the moment.
For example, the Eveready Battery company's "Energizer Bunny" and the
phrase "he keeps going, and going, and going..." have certainly acquired a
meaning and cultural significance far beyond the company's initial purpose to
sell batteries.
This distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech becomes
even more slippery when one considers the nightly news. This is speech sup-
posedly at the heart of First Amendment values, and yet it earns corporate prof-
its by selling commercial time. For example, General Electric, the owner of
NBC, sells commercial time for NBC Nightly News. Frequently, news programs
(and newspapers) include sensationalist stories, often exploiting celebrity iden-
tity, to drive up advertising rates. In other words, the newscasters offer reports
for commercial gain.
Audiences are aware of this, just as they are aware that celebrities will
often sell their endorsement to the highest bidder. This affects the audience-
determined meaning of this speech, as well as its place in popular culture. This
raises the additional issues of whether NBC Nightly News is converted into
commercial speech, and whether the commercial or non-commercial motivation
of the creator matters in making this determination.
The right of publicity clearly has operated to chill expression beyond that
which would be called "purely commercial." Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp.
723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), has frightening implications for artistic expression. This
case involved a successful right of publicity suit for a nude drawing contained in
a magazine. This drawing clearly constitutes artistic expression, for a purpose
that courts have not traditionally termed "commercial." This is analogous to
shutting down the Helmsley exhibit, supra note 115.
137. See Madow, supra note 13, at 139 n.50.
138. Id. (citing Encoding/Decoding, in CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE 128,
134-39 (Stuart Hall et al. eds., 1980)). White's preferred meaning for herself is
as everyone's neighbor, approachable. She states, "I'm playing myself, not a
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tionalize a star's preferred meaning over other meanings the
popular culture may attempt to instill. In reality, this endeavor
cannot be successful, because the popular culture will overcome.
But, it may operate on the margins to discourage those mean-
ings most at odds with the preferred meaning.
An example of how different audiences may imbue a product
with different meanings beyond the preferred meaning, and far
beyond the originator's control, is the "Ken Doll." 1 39 The manu-
facturer of this well-known piece of Americana recently created
a version of the doll with an earring and wearing a lavender
mesh shirt.140 In so doing, the manufacturer was attempting to
create a "Beverly Hills 90210"141 look for Ken. 142 The new "Ear-
ring Magic Ken," however, quickly found his way to the
mantelpieces of gay men across the country, and became a gay
cultural icon.143
This illustrates how control of a preferred meaning may be
lost, and also illustrates the type of meaning that celebrities
have attempted to stifle through the right of publicity.'4 This
example also demonstrates that courts referring to any "pains-
taking development of image"145 are according celebrities far too
much clout in the image-making process, and depriving the au-
dience of its right to continue the process of determining mean-
ing. Freezing the process at the most advantageous point for the
celebrity is an attempt to create economic rent for the celebrity
that is contrary to this process, and stultifies cultural
development.146
role." Hurley, supra note 91, at 55. Other meanings, however, exist. White is
the "drum majorette for the long march back to the 1950's," id. at 55, or "the log
cabin-to-the-White House story... an inspiration," id. at 53, or "a harbinger of
the reemergence of traditional feminine behavior." Id. at 50. Popular culture is
clearly at war over her message, and further meanings may yet emerge.
139. The "Ken Doll" is "Barbie's" companion, manufactured by Mattel.
Patty Pryor-Nolan, Outing Ken, MNEAPmOLIs STAR TREB., Nov. 3, 1993, at El.
140. Id.
141. "Beverly Hills 90210" is a popular television show on the Fox network
aimed primarily at high school viewers.
142. Frank DeCarco, Ken's All Dolled Up, but is He Still Hetero-Hunky?,
MwONI'ous STAR Tam., March 8, 1993, at E4.
143. Id.
144. Mattel spokesperson Donna Gibb stated, in an attempt at damage con-
trol, that Earring Magic Ken is "a fun, wholesome toy for young girls. [He] was
not intentionally designed for any audience other than our primary one, girls
age 3 to 10." Id.
145. Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664
(1977).
146. A celebrity's right to "free expressive association" not to be associated
with causes, products, or other cultural entities of which she disapproves may
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C. AN ALTERNATIVE: TH RIGHT OF PERFORMANCE
In place of the broad "right of publicity," courts should cre-
ate a new doctrine based on the "right of performance," 147 identi-
fied by commentators and at least implicated by the Supreme
Court.' 48 This new right would protect celebrities (and others)
from actions that directly fulfill the demand for the celebrity's
performance value. The right of performance would protect
claimants from two aspects of exploitation: exploitation of per-
sonal aspects of identity, such as through voice imitations or ce-
lebrity look-alike; and direct exploitation of a performance, such
as through non-consensual videotaping and broadcast of a
performance.
This cause of action would consist of use of a person's per-
formance identity or performance without consent. Imitation of
be seen as in tension with this meaning-determination argument. It is impor-
tant to remember, however, that attempts to confuse consumers into believing
that a celebrity has endorsed a particular product or cause when that celebrity
has not done so are prohibited. This kind of cultural discourse on the preferred
meanings of popular culture should be encouraged as part of a healthy cultural
dialogue. Additionally, celebrities command an enormous amount of media
clout, and are certainly capable of generating enough favorable coverage and
publicity to combat any secondary meanings of which they disapprove.
For instance, advocates may ironically associate a particularly strong cul-
tural image, such as John Wayne, with a cause considered a polar opposite to
this image, such as gay rights or non-violence. In a situation such as this, no
argument could be made that the user was implying John Wayne's endorse-
ment of the cause. Rather, John Wayne's image is being used on several levels
to convey a powerful message contrary to any of his specific beliefs. Another
example would be a satire of ubiquitous National Rifle Association lobbyist
Charlton Heston promoting gun control.
A further tension exists between First Amendment public figure doctrine,
as originally articulated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), and the right of publicity. Public figure doctrine requires that for a pub-
lic figure to maintain a cause of action for defamation, the alleged defamatory
statement must have been made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard for the truth. Id. at 280. This difficult standard provides a corollary
to the early argument that celebrities waived any right of privacy action
through their active pursuit of fame. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying
text (discussing cases denying recovery to celebrities who actively pursue fame).
The right of publicity, however, sets up special rights for celebrities, disregard-
ing the resources at celebrities' disposal to respond to any criticism or unflatter-
ing portrayal. See Madow, supra note 13, at 131.
147. See supra notes 15, 59 and accompanying text (distinguishing the right
of publicity from the right of performance).
148. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1976).
See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing the deprivation of direct
income from the celebrity by offering the advantage of a celebrity's recognition
at a bargain price). Such a performance would have to be uncopyrightable
under federal copyright law to avoid preemption.
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"style" alone would be insufficient. 149 This cause of action would
give no weight to whether a use was "commercial," recognizing
the underlying commercial nature of most, if not all, uses.
149. For example, the alternative/grunge rock band Stone Temple Pilots and
lead singer Weiland have frequently been accused of pirating fellow alternative/
grunge rock band Pearl Jam, both in sound and in Weiland's imitation of Pearl
Jam singer Eddie Vedder's facial grimaces. Spin magazine refers to Vedder's
"famously furrowed brow and collection of passionate grimaces" as a "near-
icon." Jim Greer, The Courtship of Eddie Vedder, SPIN, Dec. 1993, at 56. Nu-
merous commentators nationwide have noticed the similarity. See, e.g., David
Corn, Whole Lotta Policy Goin On: Some Modest Proposals for Reinventing Gov-
ernment with Grunge, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1993, at C5 ("[Using the Stone Tem-
ple Pilots song 'Dead and Bloated' as a metaphor for Washington] may run the
risk of alienating the sizable audience of Pearl Jam fans, many of whom dismiss
the Pilots as Pearl Jammabes."); Nicole Arthur, WASH. PosT, Aug. 12, 1993, at
C3 (review) (Stone Temple Pilots are "Pearl Jam soundalikes"); Gary Graff,
Stone Temple Pilots Chart Their Own Course, DEmOIT FREa PREss, July 23,
1993, at 1E (noting soundalike controversy).
Even MTV's ubiquitous cartoon duo, Beavis and Butt-head, have noted the
"sound-alike" controversy, while watching a video of the Stone Temple Pilots'
"Plush," wherein Weiland allegedly cops Vedder's vocal and facial mannerisms.
See Christopher J. Farley, Rock's Anxious Rebels, TIME, Oct. 25, 1993, at 60.
Vedder claims not to have seen the video, but states "all my friends have men-
tioned it to me." Greer, supra, at 56.
Surprisingly, the foregoing scenario seems to contain many of the elements
for stating a right of publicity action. The documentary evidence establishes
Vedder's mannerisms as extremely well-known. Weiland and the Stone Temple
Pilots have clearly evoked Vedder's identity, for substantial commercial gain.
While Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 1992), approvingly
cited jury instructions forbidding a violation for appropriation of "style," White
holds any judgment on specific means of appropriation in abeyance, stating, "It
is not important how the defendant has appropriated the plaintiff's identity,
but whether the defendant has done so." White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971
F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993). The court
further notes that denoting any "laundry list" of appropriative means would be
"impossible." Id.
An important limitation on the right of publicity is shown in an unpub-
lished case, Uri Geller v. Fallon McElligott (cited in Kent, supra note 11, at 6).
In this case, Uri Geller, a well-known psychic who claims to possess such abili-
ties as bending forks and stopping time, sued based on a Timex ad where a
psychic was shown performing actions similar to plaintiff's claimed abilities,
but being unable to stop a Timex watch.
Although the court dismissed plaintiff's action on other grounds, proceed-
ing under a right of performance cause of action would reach the same result.
Implicit in the right of performance doctrine is the requirement that the "per-
formance" in question be unique to the plaintiff. Thus, although this right may
develop beyond unfair competition law as embodied in the Lanham Act, which
it closely resembles, there is room for it to develop into its own unique area of
law. Distinguishing this new right from copyright law is the fact that, although
not allowing a property right in a claimed ability to stop time, this right would
allow a property right in a surreptitiously taped performance of Uri Geller actu-
ally stopping time. This new right is distinguished from § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act in that it does not require an element of false endorsement.
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Plaintiffs could prove damages by looking to the open market to
determine the going rate for the performance in question. A par-
ody defense' 50 would not be necessary, as parodies do not di-
rectly exploit celebrities' performance identity.
Vanna White would have no cause of action under the right
of performance. Because the Samsung commercial does not con-
stitute a performance opportunity for White, 151 her performance
identity is not being exploited. The right of performance would
contain no falsity element, so if White could prove that consum-
ers might believe she was endorsing Samsung's products, she
would be confined only to a federal cause of action under the
Lanham Act.152 This is because the right of performance is con-
cerned with protecting direct performance opportunities for ac-
tors, musicians, and other artists, rather than protecting the
public from misleading commercial information.153
Each aspect is built on solid precedential grounds. 54 Addi-
tionally, it would not stultify cultural development by privatiz-
ing a celebrity's preferred meaning, and would allow parodies
and other uses, including those for commercial gain, to flourish.
This limited right would not conflict with the federal intellectual
property scheme, as the right of publicity increasingly does. 155
Relatedly, by preserving the right of performance as state law,
state-by-state development of the right can continue on a re-
strained basis.156
150. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (distinguishing fair use par-
ody doctrine from the rights of publicity and performance).
151. See supra note 117 (requiring satirists to use the subjects of satire
themselves destroys the effect of satire).
152. See supra note 7. An example of a right of performance action without
any possible concurrent falsity action might be a commercial featuring a celeb-
rity look-alike, but with a disclaimer stating that the actual celebrity is not
involved. There is no deception, but the look-alike may be directly fulfilling
demand for the celebrity.
153. False advertising is already covered by federal law. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1988).
154. Imitation of a performer's personal characteristics is exemplified by
such cases as Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), and ex-
ploitation of an entire performance is exemplified by Zacchini v. Scripps-How-
ard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1976).
155. See supra notes 109-133 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict
between celebrity protection and traditional intellectual property law).
156. This is important as modern technology develops new methods that are
capable of exploiting performance rights, such as computer animation and digi-
tal sampling. Computer animation promises soon to be able to bring deceased
actors back from the dead for new starring roles, or even to replicate current
stars. Right of publicity law currently does not cover this situation, and state-
by-state development is important to take adequate account of this new tech-
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CONCLUSION
White continues a long line of state and federal cases that
fail to adequately justify the right of publicity's existence, or to
make any kind of accounting of the social costs imposed by the
right of publicity in its current expansive form. This Note pro-
poses that the right of publicity be entirely done away with as a
celebrity right, or at least severely curtailed. In its place, courts
and state legislatures should create a right of performance, pro-
tecting entertainers from direct economic competition in fulfil-
ling demand for their performance identity. This new right
would protect performers' primary income-earning potential,
give the public access to celebrity identity for artistic and other
cultural purposes, allow the federal intellectual property scheme
to function without interference from over-expansive state laws,
and would allow for state-by-state development to account for
the ever-changing nature of celebrity and technology.
nology's effect on different aspects of performer's rights. See Bruce Weber,
High-Tech Film Casting: Death is no Drawback, N.Y. TIEs, Mar. 11, 1994, at
B1.
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